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FOREWORD
This monograph is an audit of the policies pursued by the Obama Administration in support of the
so-called “pivot to Asia.” After explaining why U.S.
President Barack Obama chose to accord top priority
to the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) region, Dr. Douglas T.
Stuart discusses the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power, which were
available to Washington to accomplish its goals. Dr.
Stuart notes that the United States faced some unique
problems in its efforts to rely upon diplomacy, public
information, and economics to gain influence in the
region. Under these circumstances, Washington drew
upon its substantial regional military presence as the
foundation for its pivot campaign. Dr. Stuart discusses both the strengths and weaknesses of the so-called
San Francisco network of U.S.-sponsored security relationships with key regional governments. He notes
that the Obama Administration has had to adapt its
policies to the specific interests and concerns of each
regional actor, with varying degrees of success. He
accords special attention to the security concerns of
Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India.
The Obama team has been encouraged by the
generally favorable responses of many of its regional
friends and allies to U.S. calls for enhanced cooperation. Many of these governments view this cooperation
as a form of insurance in the face of an increasingly
influential and assertive China. On the other hand, the
Obama Administration has had to move cautiously,
since all of these regional actors worry about being
forced to choose between Washington and Beijing.
In this monograph, Dr. Stuart discusses three
schools of thought regarding the rise of China: “Con-
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tainers,” “Adapters,” and “Game Changers.” In a
situation in which the Obama Administration cannot make a definitive choice in favor of one of these
schools of thought, it has opted for a policy of “hedging” in order to keep its options open. Unfortunately,
it is a comment on the tragic nature of international
relations that hedging policies are likely to be interpreted negatively by the target of such actions—thus
moving both nations closer to what Graham Allison
calls the “Thucydides Trap.” Dr. Stuart recommends
certain policies that may make this unwanted development less likely.
The final section of this monograph looks beyond
the Western Pacific, noting the growing importance
of India and China’s efforts to expand their influence
into Central Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America.
Dr. Stuart also discusses the problems that the Obama
Administration has been forced to confront in other
places—e.g., Ukraine, Libya, Syria, etc.—that have
complicated its efforts to keep its focus on the pivot
strategy in the IAP region. He concludes with some
lessons for strategists, derived from the Obama team’s
experience with the pivot.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Establishing priorities is the indispensable core of
strategy formulation. The Obama Administration’s
decision to accord top priority to the Indo-Asia-Pacific
(IAP) region made good strategic sense both in terms
of the opportunities presented by the region’s unprecedented economic growth and the risks associated
with the rapidly changing security environment in the
IAP. Of special concern to the President and his advisers was the risk that a rapidly rising China would
engage in policies that would precipitate a military
confrontation with the United States—a problem that
Graham Allison has described as the “Thucydides
Trap.” The Obama Administration’s campaign was
initially described as a “pivot” strategy, but soon after it was announced, U.S. policymakers backed away
from that term on the grounds that it sounded too
tactical and temporary. In fact, the United States has
recognized the importance of the IAP in general, and
China in particular, since the late-19th century. This
monograph begins by placing the pivot in historical
context and relating it to three earlier U.S. strategies—
the Open Door, Anti-Communist Containment, and
the Nixon Doctrine.
President Obama’s top priority at the start of his
administration was a campaign of economic renewal
as a precondition for enhanced American influence
abroad. Two years later, he was ready to launch his
ambitious pivot campaign in the IAP region. This
monograph discusses the problems that the Obama
team faced in its efforts to solicit the support of regional friends and allies. Although the Obama Administration has made every effort to present the pivot as
a multifaceted strategy that employs all elements of
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national power, it has relied upon the so-called San
Francisco network of military allies and partners as the
foundation for its pivot campaign. The United States
has had considerable success in its efforts to deepen
and widen this network of security partnerships, due
in part to the fact that most of these regional actors see
Washington as a valuable source of insurance in the
face of an increasingly assertive China. Even though
the United States has been “pushing on open doors”
in the IAP region, it has had to tread carefully, in order
to avoid forcing any of these governments to choose
between Washington and Beijing. The United States
has also had to adapt its recruitment efforts to the special interests and concerns of each regional partner.
This monograph discusses many of these U.S. efforts
at bilateral and trilateral outreach, with special attention to Japan and South Korea.
The analysis of the Obama Administration’s efforts to encourage greater cooperation with regional
friends and allies is followed by a discussion of U.S.China relations. Three schools of thought regarding
the rise of China are discussed, but in a situation in
which no school of thought can be definitively proven correct, the United States has opted for a hedging
strategy toward China. Elements of this strategy are
analyzed, including some of the steps that Washington is currently taking in the IAP in accordance with
the Air-Sea Battle doctrine; recently re-christened the
Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global
Commons (JAM-GC).
The next section of this monograph surveys China’s activities beyond the Western Pacific, including
its Maritime Silk Road, the Silk Road Economic Belt,
and its String of Pearls campaign. This section also discusses the challenges that the United States has faced
xii

as it seeks to keep its focus on the IAP region despite
developments in other regions (Ukraine, Syria, etc.).
This monograph concludes with three lessons for
strategists, based on the Obama Administration’s experience with the pivot strategy. All three lessons illustrate that the only thing harder than formulating
a sophisticated long-term strategy is implementing
and sustaining the policies that are implicit in that
strategy.
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THE PIVOT TO ASIA:
CAN IT SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION
FOR AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY?
The last few months of Barack Obama’s U.S. presidency are an appropriate occasion for an audit of
President Obama’s foreign policy. Jeffrey Goldberg
attempted such an audit in the April 2016 issue of
The Atlantic, but his focus was on the Middle East in
general and Syria in particular.1 This monograph will
focus on the region that has been at the center of President Obama’s grand strategy since he took office—the
Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP). The economic arguments
for giving priority to the IAP are well known. In its
“Global Trends 2025” report, the National Intelligence
Council listed as one of a small number of “relative
certainties” that “The unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic power roughly from West
to East now underway will continue.”2 According to
Peter Petri:
Since World War II . . . Asia has grown more than
twice as fast as the rest of the world. . . . Although
other countries have also experienced rapid economic
growth over several years, the recent Asian cluster of
sustained, consistent performance has no parallel.

Petri also contends, “The structure of the U.S. economy is complementary to Asia’s and Asian growth
presents the United States with many opportunities
for mutual gain.”3
President Obama came into office convinced that
the success or failure of U.S. grand strategy in the 21st
century will be largely determined by developments in
1

the IAP region. The President also recognized that the
primary long-term security challenge that the United
States faces is the rise of China in this region, and the
possibility that Beijing will become America’s global
and regional peer competitor. Many international relations scholars have discussed the rise of China as a
test of A. F. K. Organski’s “power transition thesis.”
Professor David Lai has summarized this thesis and
discussed its implications for American national security in his monograph The United States and China in
Power Transition. Lai notes that:
There is peace and stability [in international relations]
as long as the dominant nation and its powerful allies maintain firm control. . . . However, international
relations are always in flux. . . . Challenge to the system will emerge if one or a few of the second-ranked
big nations that are also dissatisfied with the existing
international order experience significant increase in
their national power. 4

Professor Graham Allison, who has described this
situation as the “Thucydides Trap,” has observed that
in 12 of 16 instances of great power transition over the
last 500 years, the result has been war.5 This makes
the power transition thesis arguably the most reliable
predictive theory in international relations literature.
Indeed, the predictive reliability of the power transition thesis is one of the major factors that lead John
Mearsheimer to describe great power relations as a
form of tragedy. Mearsheimer concludes his discussion of the risks of U.S.-China confrontation by stating,
“let us hope that if China becomes especially powerful, the actual results of that development will contradict my theory and prove my prediction wrong.”6
However, he gives the reader no reason to expect that
positive outcome.
2

China’s recent economic problems have probably
given Washington a bit more time to adapt to the
Thucydides Trap, but it would be naïve to believe that
Beijing will accept a permanent subordinate role in
either regional or global affairs. Furthermore, as President Obama informed Jeffrey Goldberg:
If China fails; if it is not able to maintain a trajectory
that satisfies its population and has to resort to nationalism as an organizing principle; if it feels so overwhelmed that it never takes on the responsibilities of a
country its size in maintaining the international order;
if it views the world only in terms of regional spheres
of influence—then not only do we see the potential for
conflict with China, but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with these other challenges
that are going to come.7

Both the risks associated with China’s rise and the
opportunities associated with the “unprecedented
shift in . . . economic power” justify Obama’s decision to accord priority to the IAP region. However, as
this monograph will illustrate, establishing priorities
is much easier than implementing and sustaining the
policies that accord with such priorities.
THE PIVOT TO ASIA
Soon after the Obama Administration announced
its plans for a “pivot to Asia,” U.S. policymakers began to substitute the term “rebalance” for the word
“pivot,” on the grounds that rebalance sounded less
tactical and temporary. This was understandable as
an exercise in marketing; but the fact is that the IAP
in general, and China in particular, have been strategic priorities for the United States since the end of the
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19th century. Soon after the United States consolidated
its presence on the West coast, Washington began to
make plans and develop capabilities for a more assertive and influential role in the IAP. These actions were
associated with the “Open Door” concept. U.S. policymakers explained this concept in terms of fair trade—
insuring that Americans had the same access to Asian
resources and markets as other great powers. But the
Open Door was more than an economic theory. It was
the Pacific component of an American grand strategy
of balance of power—a commitment to resist efforts
by any European or Asian nation to achieve regional
hegemony as a step toward global dominance. 8
U.S. policymakers were especially concerned about
the risk that European imperial powers, or the rising
Japanese empire, would be tempted by the weakness
of the Ching dynasty to take control of large portions
of China. From the U.S. perspective, this was intolerable since it could tip the regional, and ultimately the
global, balance of power. For Washington, China was
simply too big to fail. To avoid this outcome the United
States began to pursue an active foreign policy in Asia,
which included the annexation of Hawaii, a costly and
frustrating war in the Philippines, and support for the
international military force that was deployed against
the Boxer rebellion. In accordance with the logic of the
Open Door, Secretary of State John Hay explained that
the United States had intervened against the Boxers
in order to “preserve [the] Chinese territorial and administrative entity.”9 In 1907, President Roosevelt sent
the Great White Fleet, which included 16 battleships,
to the IAP to reinforce the message that the U.S. commitment to the preservation of a balance of power in
Asia had become a permanent strategic priority.
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The United States has sustained this commitment
for more than a century. Between 1906 and 1941, U.S.
defense planners became increasingly convinced that
Japan represented the most direct threat to this strategic priority. Following World War II, Washington
made plans and undertook policies to oppose hegemonic ambitions by both Russia and (starting in
1949) the People’s Republic of China in Asia. These
policies included the only two major wars fought by
the United States during the Cold War. Following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. focus shifted to
China. George H. W. Bush was convinced that postCold War peace and prosperity required close cooperation between Beijing and Washington. He was also
convinced that he was uniquely qualified to negotiate
the terms of a condominium relationship with China,
both because of his command of U.S.-China issues
and his personal relationship with many members of
the Beijing leadership. Unfortunately, China’s brutal
crackdown on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square
in June of 1989 made it impossible for the Bush Administration to engage Beijing in a substantive dialogue. As a result, all of the legacy issues which had
bedeviled U.S.-China relations throughout the Cold
War (the standoff on the Korean peninsula, the status of Taiwan, outstanding territorial disputes in the
East China and South China Seas, etc.) were still unresolved when Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack
Obama came to office. What had changed by the time
that Obama became President was China’s ability to
defend and advance its national interests, thanks to an
average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth
rate of 10.135 percent over 2 decades.10
Jeffrey Bader, who served as senior director for East
Asian affairs on Obama’s National Security Council
from 2009 to 2011, has observed that the President’s
5

advisers recognized even before Obama’s inauguration that “The [Indo-]Asia-Pacific region deserved
higher priority in American foreign policy.” But he
also agreed that “A U.S. foreign policy based on a
weak domestic economy will ultimately be a failure.”11
This was particularly true for an ambitious U.S. foreign policy in the IAP, where all of the nations in this
region accorded top priority to continued economic
growth. Therefore, the Obama team had to improve
the domestic economy and translate that progress into
an enhanced image among Asian governments before it could pursue an ambitious pivot campaign in
the IAP.
The decision to present domestic economic renewal as a foreign policy priority made good sense in
terms of the immediate challenges faced by the new
Obama team, but it also created a unique problem for
the President. By blurring the lines between domestic and international affairs, the Obama Administration lost the natural advantages that Presidents have
traditionally enjoyed in the realm of foreign policy.
It meant that partisan opponents, and Congress in
general, became immediately engaged in the policy
debates associated with Obama’s renewal campaign.
The President made this situation even more problematic by defining economic renewal very broadly,
to include such issues as health care reform, education reform, renewable energy, and improvements in
transportation infrastructure. His massive stimulus
package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, gave every critic something to attack.12
At first, wrestling with Congress made it difficult
for the President to focus on the IAP. Obama also had
to accord priority to ending U.S. combat operations in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. The best that the administration could do under these circumstances was to
6

send some encouraging diplomatic messages to Asian
friends and allies, in the form of high-level visits to
the region. These included Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton’s visit to Asia in February of 2009—less than a
month after Obama’s inauguration. This was the first
time since 1961 that a Secretary of State had visited
Asia before any other region.13 In the same month, the
President hosted a visit by Japanese Prime Minister
Taro Aso—the first foreign head of state to visit the
White House during the Obama era. President Obama
followed these initiatives in November of 2009, with
his own visit to Asia.
In spite of strong political opposition to specific
elements of the Obama Administration’s economic renewal campaign, the economy had gained enough traction by the start of 2011 that the President was ready
to go public with the pivot to Asia.14 Many commentators date this ambitious campaign from Secretary of
State Clinton’s speech on “America’s Pacific Century”
in October of that year. The Secretary explained why
this strategy was essential for Washington, “Harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests.” She also made it
clear that the Obama team was proposing a geographic shift in American priorities, which would require
an effective demotion of the region that had been the
focus of U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the
Republic:
just as our post-World War II commitment to building
a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of
institutions and relationships has paid off many times
over. . . . The time has come for the United States to
make similar investments as a Pacific power . . .15
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Secretary Clinton’s comparison of the Obama Administration’s commitment to Asia against the postWorld War II U.S. commitment to Europe is instructive, because it alerts us to how much has changed
over the last 7 decades. What is striking about the early
Cold War era is the number of instruments that were
available to Washington to influence events abroad.
U.S. diplomats could draw upon deep international
reserves of respect, admiration, and appreciation for
America’s role in World War II. American policymakers were able to sponsor a global economic order that
was anchored in, and favorable toward, the dollar. The
Pentagon could formulate plans for a global network
of alliances, backed up by exclusive control of the
“absolute weapon.” To their credit, U.S. policymakers
chose to use the nation’s vast resources to create and
sustain a multilateral order that provided a degree of
international security and prosperity that served as
the basis for Fareed Zakaria’s “rise of the rest.”16 The
fact that the United States deserves much of the credit
for this transformation is small consolation for current U.S. policymakers who must rely upon a severely
reduced cluster of resources to achieve their strategic
goals.
THE PIVOT AND THE DIME
Students at the U.S. Army War College are encouraged to think about the multifaceted nature of power
by reference to the acronym DIME – diplomatic, information, military, and economic resources. The rhetoric of the Obama Administration has been consistent
in its recognition of the need to draw upon these and
other instruments of power to achieve its goals in the
IAP. Furthermore, as a Congressional Research Service report has noted:
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the various new and old military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives have been presented as parts of one
package. The implication is that going forward, the
United States will aim to have a much more integrated
approach to the region, in which the various tools of
power and influence are utilized in a more deliberate
and coherent fashion.17

It has been difficult, however, for the Obama team
to reconcile this rhetoric with the reality of American
power. In this section, the DIME concept will be used
to highlight some of America’s strengths and weaknesses as they pertain to the pivot to Asia.
The Obama Administration has made great efforts
to fulfill the first requirement of diplomacy—showing
up. The Obama team learned from the record of the
George W. Bush Administration that Asian governments view the attendance of high-level American
policymakers at regional meetings as a clear indication
of Washington’s interest in the region. Jeffrey Bader
notes that when Condoleezza Rice failed to attend
two annual meetings of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) during her 4 year tenure as Secretary of State, key Asian
governments concluded that “if the distance is too
great to justify a visit for a conference, it must be too
great for more serious commitments as well.”18 President Obama and his principal advisers have accorded
high priority to such regional meetings and have been
careful to balance bilateral and multilateral meetings
in Asia and in the United States.
The Obama team has also been willing to back up
its rhetoric and its diplomatic visits with substantive
policies. Arguably, the most important diplomatic initiative by the United States was taken during the first
year of Obama’s term, when the Unites States signed
9

the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with the
nations of the ASEAN. The United States was the
only major power in the region that had not signed
onto the agreement, so this accession eliminated one
roadblock to active diplomacy in the IAP. Signing the
treaty cleared the way for American membership in
the increasingly important East Asia Summit (EAS).
This accession also helped Washington to counter the
frequently heard complaint that the United States favored Northeast Asia at the expense of Southeast Asia.
A few months later, the administration reinforced its
commitment to both the Southeast Asian region and
the principles of cooperation inherent in the TAC by
releasing its Burma Policy Review. The document
committed Washington to a new campaign of “permissive engagement” with the Burmese government,
although it did not remove the existing sanctions
against the regime.19
The Obama Administration has continued to pursue a very ambitious diplomatic agenda in support of
the pivot to Asia. It has become an active participant
in the aforementioned regional institutions (ASEAN, ARF, and EAS) and in other regional organizations—such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)—as a dialogue partner. It has
also cultivated bilateral relations with China by means
of various forums, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (initiated during the George W. Bush
era as the Strategic Economic Dialogue). These efforts
have resulted in some valuable agreements with Beijing, including the U.S.-China Act on Climate Change,
confidence-building measures involving mutual notification of major military activities, and a code of conduct for air and sea military encounters.20

10

America’s diplomatic efforts have been applauded
by its friends and allies in the IAP. Some governments
nonetheless continue to express doubts about Washington’s ability and will to sustain the pivot over the
long term. The depth of this suspicion is illustrated
in a recent collection of essays by experts from nine
IAP nations: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand
and India. All of these experts, without exception,
questioned Washington’s ability to stay the course in
the IAP in light of the multiple worldwide demands
on America’s limited resources and the political, economic, and infrastructure problems that continue to
plague the United States at home.21
The United States has relied upon public information (the “I” in DIME) to reassure these Asian governments. Charmaine Misalucha argues that, at least in
terms of U.S.-Philippine relations, Washington has
been fairly successful in its campaign to sell the arguments that undergird its pivot to Asia. She summarizes the American message as follows:
America is reprioritizing towards the Asian region.
The main objectives are to sustain the United States’
leadership, to secure its economic and national interests, and to advance its values. The instruments required to achieve these objectives are strengthening
bilateral security alliances, deepening working relationships with emerging partners, engaging in multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment,
forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights. Crucial in the narrative of the rebalancing strategy is the demonstrated
fact that the groundwork has already been laid; efforts
and initiatives have already been taken towards closer
ties between the United States and Asia.22
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Misalucha’s positive assessment of America’s campaign of salesmanship is valid not just for U.S.-Philippine relations, but also for U.S. relations with most of
its friends and allies in the IAP (some exceptions will
be discussed later in this monograph).
There can be no doubt that most IAP governments
have been receptive to America’s message, in large
part because they are concerned about the prospect
of Chinese regional domination. Although all of these
governments recognize that their prosperity is tied to
the continued success of the Chinese economy, they
see cooperation with the United States as a valuable
form of insurance against the possibility that Beijing
will seek to establish a coercive form of hegemony
throughout the region. Without attributing it to Chinese bullying, former Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell confirmed in
an interview in 2011 that his job was made much easier by the overall mood in the IAP: “I have worked in
Asia for about 25 years now. I have never . . . worked
in a period in which the United States’ role was more
welcome than now.”23 Nevertheless, precisely because
the basis of this mood is circumstantial, it may change
very quickly—either because Beijing is successful in
its “friends with everybody” campaign, or because regional governments conclude that the cost and risk of
an American insurance policy is too high.
America’s economic power (the “E” in DIME) is
arguably the most problematic instrument in the nation’s repertoire. Even America’s closest traditional
allies have made it clear that they are no longer willing to defer to the United States in the management of
the global economy.24 The problem is especially acute
among Asian governments that are justifiably proud
of their economic policies over the last 2 decades, and
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still blame the United States for mismanagement of
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and for causing the
2008 Global Financial Crisis.
The relative decline of American influence within
the global economy is in stark contrast to the economic
clout of Beijing, both regionally and globally. As David Shambaugh recently observed, China is “backing
up its soft-power ventures with serious money,” in
the form of bilateral aid, development projects, and
funding for institutional alternatives to the U.S.-sponsored economic order. Shambaugh notes “Together,
these recent pledges by Beijing add up to $1.41 trillion; in contrast, the Marshall Plan cost the equivalent
of $103 billion in today’s dollars.”25 Even if one takes
account of claims that “Chinese aid deliveries lag behind pledges by a considerable margin,” and even if
one allows for some decline in aid commitments as
a result of Beijing’s current economic problems, China will remain the most important source of aid and
investment for many third world nations.26
The problems that the United States has faced in
marshalling diplomatic, information, and economic
forms of power are in striking contrast to America’s
enduring and extraordinary military power. It is, in
fact, difficult to exaggerate America’s current relative
military superiority over any prospective global peer
competitor or any realistic combination of challengers.
This situation is changing, as The Economist magazine
recently observed: “Although America still possesses
by far the most capable armed forces in the world, the
technological advantage that guarantees it can defeat
any conceivable adversary is eroding rapidly.”27 Furthermore, the frequently cited trope that the United
States spends more on defense than the next ten countries is already outdated. If current trends continue, the
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United States will spend slightly less by 2020 than the
combined defense budgets of the next five nations.28
With specific reference to the People’s Republic of
China, the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute has asserted that, if Chinese and U.S. trends
in defense spending continue, Beijing will pass Washington in military spending in real terms in 2035.29 It
is also worth noting that some nations, and some nonstate actors, have adapted their strategies and developed their military capabilities in order to present the
United States with asymmetrical threats or to achieve
limited military goals that are not likely to lead to allout war with the United States.
These considerations notwithstanding, for the
foreseeable future U.S. policymakers will be working
with a massive repertoire of military instruments, and
a much smaller pallet of diplomatic, information, and
economic forms of power, to achieve their goals in the
IAP region. The challenge for the United States will be
to rely upon its relative military advantages as a foundation for a multifaceted form of engagement with the
nations of Asia. Washington cannot behave like, or be
perceived to be, a one-trick pony, even if one of its
tricks is vastly more impressive than the rest.
THE FOUNDATION: GETTING BEYOND
SAN FRANCISCO
Prior to the end of World War II, U.S. defense planners began to address the question of how and where
they could expend military resources in order to insure
stability and security in the IAP. It soon became apparent that the region was so large and complex that it
would be extremely difficult to sponsor a multilateral
defense network of the type that became the North
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the European
theater. The second-best option that was chosen by the
United States was a “hub-and-spokes” arrangement of
bilateral (U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Philippines) and trilateral
(U.S.-Australia-New Zealand) alliances. This so-called
San Francisco System of alliances expanded (Taiwan,
South Korea, etc.) and contracted (South Vietnam,
the Philippines, New Zealand) throughout the Cold
War. From time to time, Washington experimented
with multilateral arrangements in the IAP (most notably, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), but
the aforementioned problems of geographic size and
complexity always frustrated these efforts. Contrary to
the predictions of many experts, however, the system
not only survived two major wars and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, but it also came out of the Cold War
with a new sense of purpose. Indeed, although the San
Francisco system has often been presented as a weak
sister to NATO, the Asian hub-and-spokes network
has not suffered the kinds of problems of identity and
purpose that have plagued the transatlantic alliance.
It is not surprising under these circumstances that the
residual San Francisco system was identified as the
logical foundation for the Obama Administration’s
pivot to Asia.
The system was not without defects: first and foremost, it was, and is, geostrategically top-heavy. As a
result of developments during the Cold War—in particular, the failure of the United States in Vietnam and
the U.S. loss of bases in the Philippines—the system
is too dependent on two anchor points in Northeast
Asia (Japan and South Korea), and comparatively underdeveloped throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania,
and South Asia. This situation poses problems for defense planners who are still committed to a Rimland
defense posture. It also makes Washington too vulner15

able to political changes in South Korea and Japan that
can create ripple effects across the entire region. These
problems will be discussed in the next section of this
monograph.
This top-heavy alliance network is also too dependent on developments in the most unpredictable nation in the world—North Korea. Since the end of the
Korean War, the United States has developed its bases
and defense plans in Northeast Asia around two possibilities: a North Korean attack on South Korea and/
or Japan, and chaos in the wake of regime collapse in
Pyongyang. These threats have helped Washington to
justify its military presence in Northeast Asia, both to
the American people and to the publics in South Korea
and Japan. It has also made it possible for the United
States to sustain a strong neo-containment posture
toward China, without having to admit it publicly.
However, a military presence that is explicitly built
around the North Korean threat has made the United
States a captive to developments on the Korean peninsula over which the United States may have little or
no control. It has also made it possible for opponents
of the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia to depict the
United States as a nation that has a stake in the perpetuation of the North-South Korean conflict.
There are also severe limits to what the United
States can do on its own to strengthen the San Francisco system as a foundation for a multifaceted pivot
to Asia. The pivot strategy is, in fact, an extension of
the Nixon Doctrine, which has been guiding U.S. foreign policies toward the IAP since 1969, when it was
launched by Richard Nixon at a press conference in
Guam. The doctrine put Asian friends and allies on
notice that Washington expected them to become
more self-reliant in dealing with non-nuclear threats.
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According to Melvin Laird, Nixon’s Secretary of
Defense:
The Nixon Doctrine and its supporting national security strategy strike a balance between what America
should do and what our friends can do. The doctrine
permits [the] U.S. to do enough, without doing, or attempting to do, too much.30

At the time, many critics interpreted the Nixon
Doctrine as a sign of American retreat from its global
responsibilities; in acutality, as this author has noted
in a previous study, “In conjunction with the opening
to China, the Nixon Doctrine helped to make it possible for the Nixon-Henry Kissinger team to scale back
U.S. strategic ambitions and obligations across the
region.”31 It preserved America’s regional presence
and influence by abandoning the quest for regional
dominance.
The logic of the Nixon Doctrine has continued to
guide U.S. foreign policy toward the IAP up to the
present time. However, circumstances have changed
in two important respects. First, Washington did not
have to ask that much of its regional friends and allies
during the latter stages of the Cold War because of
the gradual improvement in U.S.-China relations. This
situation began to change after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as U.S. defense planners began to focus on
China as a potential threat to U.S. global and regional
interests. Second, since the arrival of the Obama Administration, the United States has been explicit in its
recognition of the IAP as the future center of gravity
of world politics. This has enhanced the negotiating
leverage of these Asian governments in discussions
with Washington about capacity building and burden sharing. Under these changed circumstances,
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the United States has had to ask more of its regional
friends and allies, and work harder to get them to
do more. Washington must also be more concerned
about the possibility that, as key Asian governments
enhance their military capabilities, they will use them
in ways that are incompatible with, or contrary to, the
interests of the United States.
Having concluded that the San Francisco network
of friends and allies was the best foundation for the
pivot, the Obama Administration began to pursue
very public policies to enhance both the military capabilities of the system and its image as a viable and reliable basis for regional security. The first very public action by the Obama Administration was an agreement
with Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard in 2011
to provide U.S. Marines with base access in Darwin,
in the Northern Territory. At present, there are 1,150
Marines training at this facility, and plans call for up
to 2,500 Marines in Darwin by 2017. This was followed
a year later by the announcement that the government
of Singapore had agreed to allow the U.S. Navy to use
its Changi Naval Base for the rotational deployment
of up to four littoral combat ships by 2018. The first
of such vessels made a port visit to the Changi base
in 2013. Finally, and most importantly, Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta announced that, “By 2020, the
navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 5050 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic
to about a 60-40 split between those oceans.” He also
announced plans to increase the number and size of
U.S. training exercises with America’s IAP security
partners.32
Washington has also been working quietly to encourage selected regional governments to sign onto
new “minilateral” defense cooperation agreements.
Examples include the U.S.-Australia-Japan Strategic
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Dialogue, and the U.S.-Japan-India Trilateral Dialogue. The United States is actively seeking to expand
upon these existing minilateral arrangements, and
to identify opportunities for new agreements (between Japan and South Korea, between Japan and
Vietnam, etc.).
The United States has enjoyed considerable success
to date in its efforts to cultivate new forms of security
cooperation in the IAP. To sustain this momentum,
however, the Obama Administration understands
that it has to convince key regional governments that
enhanced cooperation with the United States serves
their specific long-term national security interests at
a manageable cost and risk. Rather than a “one-sizefits-all” approach, the United States has been adapting
its messages to the unique concerns and goals of each
IAP actor.33 The following section is a brief survey of
some of these efforts.
As the principal anchor point in the San Francisco
system, Japan has been accorded top priority in the
U.S. rebalancing campaign. The Obama team has intensified efforts, which have been ongoing since the
latter stages of the Cold War, to convince Tokyo to
take greater responsibility for its national security and
to contribute more to both regional and global security. This has forced Washington and Tokyo to publicly
confront longstanding sources of tension. Since the
late-1940s, Japan’s relationship with the United States
has been based on two hard-to-reconcile components:
a defense treaty, which allows the United States to establish an extensive military presence in Japan; and
a pacifist constitution, which places strict limits on
the security assistance that Tokyo can provide to its
American ally or to its regional neighbors. Over the
years, many Japanese leaders have complained about
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the economic, political, and social costs associated
with the presence of more than 80-U.S. bases in Japan.
U.S. policymakers, meanwhile, have often expressed
frustration with what they see as Japan’s exploitation
of its pacifist identity to avoid carrying its fair share of
the defense burden.
Since coming to office in December of 2012, Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe has been testing the limits of domestic support for a more active and assertive Japanese defense posture. His government has chipped
away at the constitutional prohibitions against the
use of force overseas. He articulated a new vision of
“collective self-defense” during an April 2015 visit to
Washington, agreeing to the new Guidelines for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation:
the two governments will take measures to ensure
Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly,
from peacetime to contingencies, including situations
when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. 34

The two governments agreed to increased bilateral coordination in such areas as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defense, and
maritime security. They also agreed that U.S.-Japan
security cooperation would extend to “the Indo-AsiaPacific region and beyond.”35 Tokyo has backed up
such statements with significant improvements in its
military capabilities, including steady enhancement
of its ballistic missile defense system and a commitment to purchase 42 F-35A aircraft.36 According to
the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)
the acquisition of the F-35’s “. . . will eventually provide the ASDF [Air Self-Defense Force] with a formidable fifth-generation multi-role aircraft with stealth
characteristics, which should match up well against,
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if perhaps not totally surpass, Chinese capabilities.”
The IISS report goes on to speculate that “This type of
capability might be used to strike against North Korean missile bases or even the Chinese mainland in a
contingency, marking a radical departure in Japan’s
defence-oriented posture.”37
The Obama Administration has encouraged Prime
Minister Abe’s efforts to improve Japan’s capability
for “dynamic defense.”38 However, U.S. policymakers recognize that the Prime Minister is out in front
of the Japanese public on this issue. According to a
recent Pew Research Center poll, 23 percent of Japanese favor an expanded security role while 68 percent
are opposed.39 Mr. Abe must also maneuver between
his desire to reassure Washington of his nation’s military reliability and the need to deal with persistent
local opposition to U.S. bases in the Okinawa prefecture, which is home to 74 percent of all U.S. bases in
Japan.40 The United States has attempted to assist the
Prime Minister in managing this local political problem by agreeing to move 9,000 U.S. Marines to Guam,
Australia, and Hawaii—and by continuing patiently
and persistently to negotiate with Japanese stakeholders on plans to move the U.S. Marine Air Base from
Futenma to Henoko. These deliberations have been
ongoing since 2006.41 The talks are likely to remain
tendentious, however, due to the unique three-sided
(United States, Japan, and Okinawa) nature of the deliberations.42 While Tokyo would like to find a way to
move forward with the relocation, many Okinawan
residents continue to register the feelings that former
Okinawan Governor Hirokazu Nakaima communicated in 2011, when he stated before an American audience that Tokyo would have to rely on “bayonets
and bulldozers” to move forward with the development of the Henoko base.43
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It has also been difficult for both Tokyo and Washington to coordinate their policies regarding the Sino-Japanese dispute over ownership of the Senkaku
(known in China as Diaoyu) Islands. The Obama
Administration has repeatedly stated that the Islands
are under the protection of the United States in accordance with Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan defense pact.
However, the President has also made it clear that he
expects both parties to seek a peaceful resolution to
this territorial dispute. Both Beijing and Tokyo continue to play to nationalist constituencies over the status
of the Senkaku Islands and over unresolved historical
controversies. Sheila Smith has observed:
by early 2013, it was clear that a mishap or misjudgment could easily propel China and Japan towards the
use of military force. Many feared that heated popular
sentiment would exacerbate the sovereignty dispute
making the spiral of escalation especially difficult to
control.44

While continuing to work with Tokyo to improve
bilateral defense cooperation, Washington must also
press both China and Japan to look for ways to moderate and manage their outstanding disputes. The
situation is made more complicated by the fact that
Taiwan is also a claimant to the disputed Islands, and
as Fu-Kuo Liu has observed, “it would not be in U.S.
interests to have to deal with two strategic partners
fighting each other.”45
It will also be hard for Mr. Abe to pursue a more
ambitious regional security role, since many of Japan’s
neighbors still harbor suspicions and resentments towards Tokyo due to its activities during World War
II. Since coming to office, the Prime Minister has visited all ten members of ASEAN in an effort to enhance
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Japan’s status and influence in Southeast Asia. However, these efforts have been offset to some extent by
his controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which
commemorates, among the more than 2,466,000 divinities, 14 individuals who have been convicted of
war crimes. Furthermore, in a recent speech marking
the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Abe
made it clear that he is unwilling to go further in publicly atoning for Japan’s wartime history.46
Tokyo’s handling of its war record has been a special source of anger among South Koreans, as illustrated by a 2013 poll reported in The Asahi Shimbun, which
found that 76.6 percent of South Korean respondents
had either an “unfavorable” or a “relatively unfavorable” opinion of the Japanese.47 Nor is there any reason
to believe that South Korean leaders are more willing
to cooperate with Japan than the South Korean public. Current South Korean President Park Geun-hye
stated in January of 2015 that she was willing to meet
with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at any time
and without preconditions, but she refused to engage
in a bilateral summit with Prime Minister Abe until he
did more to atone for Japan’s past actions, including
its treatment of so-called “comfort women.”48
As recent flare-ups on the Korean peninsula illustrate, South Korea occupies a uniquely exposed and
strategically vulnerable position in the IAP region.49
South Korea has been in a state of war for over 6
decades with the most unpredictable regime in the
world—a nuclear-armed opponent that is constantly
developing its missile and artillery forces, backed by
a standing army of over 900,000 troops. From time to
time North Korea engages in outrageously provocative attacks on South Korean territory, citizens, and
political leaders—often accompanied by warnings of
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plans for “all-out war” against South Korea and “preemptive nuclear strikes” against the United States.50
On top of these provocations, Seoul must also be
constantly aware of the risk of loss of control by the
regime in Pyongyang. This risk has become more immediate since the arrival of Kim Jong-un, who has
reportedly been purging, and in many cases executing, North Korean leaders, including his Minister of
Defense. The South Korean National Intelligence Service estimates that there have been about 70 such executions since Kim took power in December of 2011.51
This turbulence at the top injects an additional level of
unpredictability into an already dangerously unstable
situation.
North Korea engaged in two of its most blatant
acts of aggression in 2010—the sinking of the South
Korean naval vessel Cheonan in March and artillery attacks on the island of Yeonpyeong in November. Following the Yeonpyeong attack, Seoul complied with
requests by Washington and other governments for a
measured response, but South Korea has since made
it clear that it will not exercise such restraint in the future. In March of 2011, the government issued Defense
Reform Plan 307, which established new guidelines
for military responses to North Korean provocations.
Deterrence by denial, the traditional basis for South
Korean security, was replaced by a new “proactive deterrence” concept which authorized field commanders to engage in what Abraham Denmark describes
as “prompt, focused, and disproportionate retaliatory
(and perhaps even preemptive) actions in order to
raise the costs to North Korea of small-scale attacks.”52
In 2013, Washington contributed to South Korean
efforts to bolster its deterrent posture by including
strategic bombers and a nuclear-powered attack submarine in its combined military exercises with Seoul.53
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Washington has also offered to provide South Korea
with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
batteries capable of countering North Korean missile
attacks in the event of an all-out war on the peninsula.
U.S. and South Korean efforts to improve extended deterrence are made more difficult by the fact that
both governments must constantly monitor and adapt
their policies toward North Korea so that they account
for Pyongyang’s principal sponsor—China. Beijing
has more influence than any other government over
North Korea’s actions, but China has been reminded
from time to time that no government can confidently
assume that it has control over the Hermit Kingdom.
Beijing has publicly begun to express its frustration
with this situation, as illustrated by its support of severe sanctions on Pyongyang following North Korea’s
fourth nuclear test.54
Seoul must also accord high priority to continued
economic cooperation with China. Beijing is Seoul’s
largest trading partner, with bilateral trade amounting
to $228.9 billion in 2013. South Korea expects this figure to grow to more than $300 billion per year thanks
to the recently completed free trade agreement.55 As
bilateral economic relations continue to improve,
South Korean diplomatic relations with China have
also developed. These diplomatic relations developments are illustrated in the recent visit to Beijing by
South Korea’s President to participate in the celebration of the 70th anniversary of China’s victory over
Japan in World War II. Her attendance at this event
was made more notable by the conspicuous absence
of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
The Obama Administration has demonstrated a
sophisticated appreciation of South Korea’s difficult
situation. However, Seoul has still found several rea-
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sons to be concerned about America’s pivot to Asia.
First and foremost, it has been hard for South Korean
defense experts to get excited about a U.S. rebalance
to the region, because from Seoul’s point of view the
Americans never left. In a situation in which the U.S.
military presence on the peninsula has been the reality for three generations of Koreans, American talk of
a new campaign of active involvement in Asia inevitably raises concerns about risky disruptions and the
relative demotion of South Korea in America’s foreign
policy.
Some South Korean defense experts are also worried that the United States will increase its pressure
on Seoul to develop new modes of defense cooperation with Tokyo. Minilateral defense cooperation between Japan and South Korea is a logical next step in
Obama’s plans for the pivot to Asia. Unfortunately,
Prime Minister Abe has widened the gap between Japan and South Korea by his assertions that Japan has
done enough to atone for its human rights violations
prior to and during the Second World War; President
Park sees no domestic political benefit in softening her
position on Japanese war guilt just to accommodate
Washington. The two governments also have unresolved disputes over the Dokdo (in Japanese, Takeshima) islets in the Sea of Japan (called the East Sea by
Koreans).56 Both Japan and South Korea are working
with the United States to establish minilateral security
arrangements with other Asian actors. However, as
valuable as these initiatives are, they tend to make the
anomaly of Japanese-South Korean animosity more
evident.
Some South Korean experts view the pivot as posing a long-term problem for Seoul, as it evolves into a
true pan-Pacific and Indian Ocean security strategy.
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Various U.S. initiatives, including the development
of the American base in Darwin, the expansion of the
U.S. military presence in Guam, the American port access arrangement with Singapore, and the U.S.-India
security dialogue all make sense by reference to the
U.S. pivot. From Seoul’s point of view, however, anything that shifts the focus of U.S. defense planning
away from the Korean peninsula is a problem. Some
South Korean defense planners also worry that a panAsian pivot campaign could entrap Seoul in a conflict
with China over an issue that does not relate to South
Korean security or national interests. In this regard,
it is worth noting that South Korea is different than
most of Washington’s friends and allies in that it does
not have any territorial disputes with China.
The pivot also has the potential to disrupt South
Korean efforts at outreach toward North Korea. In an
important article in Foreign Affairs in 2011, President
Park committed her government to a Trustpolitik campaign of conditional reconciliation with Pyongyang,
stating that “even if Seoul must respond forcefully to
Pyongyang’s provocations, it must also remain open
to new opportunities for improving relations between
the two sides.” While recognizing the level of distrust
and tension that existed on the peninsula, she cited the
case of the Nixon Administration’s opening to China
to support her claim that “trust can be built on incremental gains” between North and South Korea.57 President Park has also pursued policies toward China,
including her attendance at the aforementioned 70th
anniversary event in Beijing, to advance the cause of
Trustpolitik. Seoul’s efforts to improve relations with
Pyongyang have suffered some serious setbacks in recent years, but many South Koreans continue to hope
for either “incremental gains” or a diplomatic break-

27

through that will at least end the state of war between
the two nations.
From Washington’s point of view, Seoul’s efforts
to improve relations with China, while also seeking
opportunities for reconciliation with Pyongyang, are
understandable and commendable. However, they
also pose potential problems for the pivot strategy,
and for the long-term maintenance of the San Francisco security network. In the event that South Korea
should achieve progress in its relations with China
and North Korea, the presence of American troops in
South Korea would inevitably become a subject for
discussion. Under these circumstances, Washington
might find itself in the position of having to, or seeming to, oppose progress in North-South cooperation
out of a concern for the ripple effects of the removal of
U.S. troops from the peninsula.
In this exquisitely complex situation, both Seoul
and Washington recognize the need for close policy
coordination and the preservation of an effective extended deterrence posture. Fortunately, the United
States can be reassured by the 6 decades of South
Korean support and gratitude that has its roots in
America’s intervention in the Korean War. Edward
Luttwak has argued that close economic cooperation
and cultural affinity have helped to tip the scales in
favor of China in South Korea’s balancing act between
Washington and Beijing. He accuses Seoul of “strategic escapism,” which he asserts “make[s] its practitioners unfit as active allies.”58 Such claims fly in the face
of the empirical evidence of strong U.S.-South Korean
defense cooperation for over 6 decades. They also fail
to credit the sophistication of South Korea’s “middle
power” diplomacy in northeast Asia.59
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Washington must also adapt its policies to the
special circumstances and interests of key friends and
allies in Oceania and Southeast Asia. The differing reactions of Australia and New Zealand to the American pivot illustrate how hard it is for Washington to
pursue a one-size-fits-all campaign. At one extreme is
Canberra, which is publicly supportive of the American pivot strategy. Australians pride themselves on
having “the other special relationship” with the United States, and many argue that it has the right to claim
to have the “more special relationship.”60 Canberra reinforced the message of reliable support by its offer in
2011 to host U.S. troops in Darwin on a rotational basis. Since that time, Canberra has helped Washington
to sustain the momentum of the pivot by its cultivation of new forms of minilateral defense cooperation
across the Asian region. Examples include a recently
announced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
with Singapore, which will bolster their joint training
activities, give Singapore increased access to training
facilities in Australia, and identify new forms of intelligence sharing.61 Australia has also entered into minilateral agreements with Japan on technology sharing
and policy coordination on territorial disputes in the
South China Sea.62 Other notable examples include
the Australian-Indonesian Defense Cooperation Arrangement, the Framework for Security Cooperation
between Canberra and New Delhi, and Australia’s
leadership of the Five Power Defense Arrangements,
which has facilitated consultations and joint exercises
among Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Singapore, and Malaysia since 1971. As a result of these and
other initiatives, Canberra has done more than any
other regional partner of the United States to move the
San Francisco system from a hub-and-spokes arrange-
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ment to a web of cross-cutting and mutually reinforcing security agreements.63
While Canberra continues to demonstrate its indispensability as a regional ally and a global security
partner, Washington would be mistaken to take for
granted Australia’s unquestioning support of the pivot. While noting that the U.S.-Australia alliance is in
“remarkably good shape,” Brendan Taylor has identified “a marked disjuncture between official Australian
pronouncements on the U.S. pivot and the sometimes
quite heated public debate that has emerged.”64 Taylor traces the expressions of concern and criticism to
suspicions among Australian policymakers and opinion shapers about America’s ability to work with its
regional friends and allies to manage the rise of China without slipping into a war. Taylor includes two
former Prime Ministers—Paul Keating and Malcolm
Fraser—among the vociferous critics of what Fraser
describes as “American militarization of the Western
Pacific and the policies of [anti-Chinese] containment
that this implies.”65
The suspicions and concerns registered by some influential individuals in Australia are even more prevalent in New Zealand, which views the pivot from its
own unique geostrategic position. As Robert Ayson
reminds us, “The distance between Auckland and Tokyo . . . is about the same as that between Tokyo and
Istanbul. Even Southeast Asia is a long way from the
New Zealand landmass.”66 This means that New Zealand views much of the U.S. activity in support of the
pivot as somewhat marginal to its natural strategic orientation toward the South Pacific. The U.S.-New Zealand bilateral security relationship has actually been
improving since the George W. Bush era—thanks in
particular to Auckland’s contribution to allied military
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operations in Afghanistan since 2001. However, New
Zealanders also remember that Washington terminated its Australia, New Zealand, United States Security
Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) obligations toward Auckland
in 1985, with no appreciable negative impact on New
Zealand’s security. These factors impose strict limits to how far the United States can go in asking for
New Zealand’s public support for the pivot, particularly if that support is in the form of increased defense
spending.
Concerns about American reliability are also
prevalent among some Southeast Asian governments.
Washington has been “pushing on open doors” in
its security-related discussions with most Southeast
Asian governments as a result of China’s growing
force projection capability and increased diplomatic
assertiveness.67 Most of these regional governments
have favored a “soft balancing” strategy toward
China, because they are not convinced of America’s
long-term reliability, or because of the priority that
they accord to economic and political cooperation
with Beijing.68 Soft balancing has taken many forms
in Southeast Asia, including an increased reliance on
multilateral institutions—such as ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN + 3, the East Asian Summit, and ASEAN Defense
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)—to influence
Chinese foreign policy. Southeast Asian governments
have been attracted to such an institutional arrangement since decolonization, both as a means of facilitating cooperation among themselves and as a tactic for
increasing their diplomatic clout in relations with external great powers. Various unsuccessful attempts by
the members of ASEAN to present China with a common front on Beijing’s territorial claims in the South
China Sea have nonetheless been criticized by both
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Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and ASEAN
Secretary General Le Luong Minh.69 The United States
has also expressed its frustration with what it views as
ASEAN’s dithering in the face of China’s increasingly
assertive policies in the South China Sea.
Although Southeast Asian governments often attempt to speak with one voice on issues relating to
the pivot, they still develop their foreign policies and
security positions by reference to distinct historical experiences and differing national interests. The result
is a continuum of support for the U.S.-led pivot; from
Singapore on the explicitly supportive end, to Thailand at the other extreme of publicly expressed suspicion of the pivot and a preference for bandwagoning
with China.
The United States accords special status to Singapore, not just because of its strategic location at the
intersection of the Indian and Pacific ocean, but also
because it has been a role model for other Southeast
Asian actors in support of the American pivot. First,
Singapore has demonstrated its support for United
States calls for military burden sharing. With a population of less than 1 percent of the nations of Southeast
Asia, the city-state has the biggest defense budget in
the region, in both real terms ($9.5 billion) and as a
percentage of GDP (3.3 percent).70 Second, Singapore
has actively collaborated with the United States in
training activities, military exercises, maritime safety
operations, and disaster relief operations. In 2012, the
United States and Singapore took the next step in this
collaborative relationship by entering into a Strategic
Partnership Dialogue (SPD) covering a wide range of
security-related issues, including the aforementioned
forward deployment of U.S. littoral combat ships at
Changi naval base. According to David Adelman, the
U.S. Ambassador to Singapore:
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Having the ships in the region will allow our two countries to pursue one of our primary shared interests:
maritime security, assuring stability and free trade
routes in the seas surrounding the Strait of Malacca.71

Singapore has also established itself as an influential host of various security-related conferences, including the prestigious annual Shangri-La Dialogue,
sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. Beginning in 2002 as a forum for discussion
among defense experts, the Dialogue has evolved into
an opportunity for meetings among high-level policymakers on controversial topics relating to regional
security.
Singapore’s leading newspaper The Straits Times attributed the close security cooperation between Singapore and the United States to the fact that the interests
of the two governments “remain highly complementary: Singapore desires and welcomes a countervailing American presence in the region, while the United
States needs friendly locations that will facilitate such
a presence.”72 There is ample reason to be optimistic
about the future of this bilateral security relationship.
However, as Tim Huxley has observed, Singapore’s
forthright support for the American pivot could place
the city-state in an exposed and unwelcomed position:
What if the U.S. wanted to use Changi naval base to resupply a carrier battle group during a crisis with China over Taiwan? Or if the USN [U.S. Navy] dispatched
littoral combat ships from Singapore to support the
Philippines in a new stand-off with China? Scenarios
such as these would require extreme adroitness on the
part of Singapore’s political leadership and diplomats
to ensure that the expanded security partnership with
the U.S. would not incur the obligations and costs that
only an ally would usually be expected to bear.73
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Each of America’s regional security partners has its
own comparable list of what if concerns, although
in many cases these governments have scrupulously
avoided raising them in public.
The Philippines can also be counted as an explicit
supporter of the American pivot strategy. Edward
Luttwak observed that, “From a Chinese and strategic point of view, the Republic of the Philippines was
little more than an extension of the United States”
until the United States was forced to close its bases
in the Philippines in the early-1990s. He speculates
that after the U.S. troops departed, China was “very
well positioned to supplant the United States as a benevolent greater state.”74 Nevertheless, growing tension between Manila and Beijing over the contested
islands in the South China Sea has forced the Philippines to recommit to the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. The two governments have entered into
an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which
will allow the United States to use parts of five Philippine military bases.75 Manila is also committed to an
ambitious campaign of internal balancing, in the form
of a 25 percent increase in defense spending in 2016.76
Philippine policymakers have made it clear that the
additional funding, which will be used to purchase
navy frigates and patrol aircraft, are a direct response
to Chinese bullying in the South China Sea. While
Washington approves of Manila’s increased interest
in defense cooperation, it continues to encourage its
Asian ally to seek a peaceful resolution to the ongoing
territorial disputes with China.
Although Thailand is a formal treaty partner with
the United States, it is located at the other extreme
from Singapore in terms of its response to the American pivot strategy. As Kitti Prasirtsuk and William
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Tow have noted, “there is an evident disconnect between United States and Thai perceptions on how to
manage the ‘rise of China.’”77 This is partly a function
of geography; Bangkok does not share a border with
China and it has no outstanding territorial disputes
with Beijing. It is also partly attributable to economics. In 2010, China replaced the United States as Thailand’s largest trading partner. Recently, however, the
principal source of tension between Washington and
Bangkok has been politics. U.S.-Thai relations were severely damaged in 2014, when Washington cancelled
$4.7 million in foreign aid to Bangkok in response to
the second military coup in Thailand over the last decade.78 While it is unlikely that the U.S.-Thai alliance
will completely collapse, Bangkok will remain more
of a problem than a solution for American defense
planners.
By comparison to Singapore, the Philippines, and
Thailand, the other Southeast Asian governments are
uncomfortable fence sitters—deeply concerned about
China’s growing maritime threat and increasing assertiveness, but also suspicious of America’s reliability as a long-term guarantor of regional security and
prosperity. They will attempt to keep all of their options open, in the face of United States calls for greater
burden sharing and Chinese efforts at inducement
and coercion. To date, the United States has demonstrated an understanding of this situation and has
been content to pursue modest incremental progress
in bilateral and multilateral security relations consistent with its pivot strategy. Washington has had less
success, however, in its efforts to convince Beijing to
live within the constraints imposed by this strategy.
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U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: THE PIVOT POINT
Most of the scholars and policymakers who follow
the rise of China and its implications for America tend
to fall into one of three schools: “Containers,” “Adapters,” or “Game Changers.”
Containers tend to be focused on the risks associated with the Thucydides Trap. As noted in the introduction to this monograph, history provides strong
support for the proposition that war is very likely
when a rising, revisionist power (like China) challenges a dominant status quo power (like the United
States). This leads many commentators to agree with
John Mearsheimer in that, “The optimal strategy for
dealing with China is containment.” Mearsheimer
also recommends that Washington “stay in the background as much as possible and let China’s neighbors
assume most of the burden of containing China.” 79
He also asserts that the United States “has a profound
interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably,” even if it has a negative impact on the U.S.
economy.80 The common criticism of the Containers is
that, by treating China as an enemy, they insure that it
will become one.
Adapters implicitly or explicitly question the predictive power of the Thucydides Trap in the case of
U.S.-China relations. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Hugh
White are influential representatives of this school of
thought.81 Spokespersons for this school of thought
point to the cautionary influence of the U.S.-China
nuclear standoff, and the still-large disparity between
U.S. and Chinese military capabilities, to support the
argument that conflict between Washington and Beijing is highly unlikely. They also place a great deal
of faith in U.S.-China economic interdependence as a
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mitigating factor in the bilateral relationship. Finally,
they believe that Washington and Beijing will find
common ground in their efforts to manage major international challenges, such as global climate change
and resource depletion. Critics tend to depict this line
of argument as wishful thinking, or at least as an unreliable basis for U.S. strategy.
Game Changers are a mixed bag of experts and
policymakers who focus upon one or more aspects
of the U.S.-China relationship, which they expect to
undergo fundamental change. Influential examples
include Edward Steinfeld’s argument that China will
be transformed by a process of “self-obsolescing authoritarianism” into a more democratic and benign
international actor, and claims by Chinese experts
that China has no interest in challenging the United
States because it is still a developing country that
faces numerous domestic problems.82 While many
game changers argue that the United States does not
need to be concerned about China’s rise, others warn
that some of the serious problems that Beijing faces
(economic, environmental, political, etc.) could trigger dangerously unpredictable developments, which
would negatively affect its neighbors and the United
States. Under these circumstances, Game Changers
tend to favor American efforts to help China achieve
a soft landing. Other critics, however, argue that there
is not enough evidence to justify building American
policies around these claims.
In recent months, Game Changers have focused
on the ongoing economic problems that plague Beijing. Most of these problems, including the decline in
GDP growth and growing debt, are unavoidable for
an economy that must shift from investments and
exports to domestic consumption. The situation is
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made more difficult, however, by the decline in global
demand for Chinese products.83 Beijing is reacting
grudgingly, and in some cases unwisely, to the fact
that a 6 percent GDP growth is likely to be the new
normal for the foreseeable future. However, as Simon
Rabinovitch has observed, “there is a big difference
between a recession and growth of 6% or so.”84 Yuan
Yang and Tom Mitchell also remind us:
it is easy to forget that because China’s economy is
so much bigger after its tremendous growth spurt, in
terms of absolute growth it is still contributing more to
the global economy than it did a decade ago.85

The problem that American strategists face is that
all three schools of thought—Containers, Adapters,
and Game Changers—can cite specific trends and behaviors to support their assertions, but none of their
arguments can be definitively proven or disproven.
Containers can point to the double-digit People’s Republic of China defense spending and coercive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, but they have
difficulty directly linking these indicators to the claim
that China will be a global peer competitor with the
United States. Adapters can point to examples of Chinese “friends with everybody” behavior, but they cannot assure Beijing’s neighbors that these actions will
be sustained. Game changers face special problems in
their efforts to elevate anecdotal evidence of factors
that could disrupt China’s rise to the level of reliable
trends.
In a situation in which no school of thought can
achieve the status of a dominant paradigm, strategists
must pursue policies that are appropriate for each of
the three points of view. With reference to the containment school, caution requires that Washington pre38

serve, and in some cases enhance, its military presence
in the IAP, but it must avoid military policies which
unnecessarily exacerbate bilateral tensions. In accordance with the logic of adaptation, the United States
must follow Hugh White’s advice that the United
States look for ways to “negotiate a new relationship
with China as soon as possible, before the power balance shifts further China’s way.”86 Finally, the United
States should be guided by the arguments of the Game
Changers to look for ways to assist China to cope with
problems that threaten the survival of the Beijing regime. Reconciling all three of these approaches will
require a Goldilocks strategy, characterized by the following rules.
First, continue to pursue military policies built on
the residual San Francisco security system that do not
foreclose possibilities for U.S.-China cooperation or
force America’s regional friends and allies to choose
sides. Some of the Obama Administration’s policies
fulfill these standards. If managed properly, the aforementioned 60-40 military shift to the IAP can shore up
America’s extended deterrence posture without unnecessarily exacerbating Chinese fears. Likewise, the
new base access agreement between Washington and
Manila, the development of training facilities in Darwin, and the agreement with Singapore for periodic
port visits by littoral combat ships can all be managed
in such a way that they do not precipitate Chinese
insecurities. These policies are compatible with the
goals of hardening, improving, and diversifying U.S.
military assets in the IAP, as articulated in the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle (ASB) doctrine. On the other
hand, those aspects of ASB which are designed for
“networked, integrated attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat” Chinese anti-access and area-denial
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assets should be avoided. 87 Chinese policymakers will
inevitably interpret long-range precision strike weapons capable of eliminating PLA missiles and command and control systems on the Chinese mainland
as a threat to the survival of China’s nuclear force.
This would make crisis management much more difficult. It might also force some of Washington’s regional
partners to reassess the costs and benefits of close security cooperation with the United States. The repackaging of the ASB as the Joint Concept for Access and
Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) will not
reassure these governments, and it certainly will not
reassure Chinese defense planners.
Second, the United States should accord a higher
priority to enhancing strategic stability in the IAP by
working with China to develop confidence building,
conflict avoidance, and crisis management arrangements—especially in the South China and East China
Seas. Recently, Beijing has engaged in development
activities designed to present its neighbors with “facts
on the ground” that favor its claims to the contested territories. Unfortunately, the United States has felt compelled to respond to these provocations by becoming
more involved in these disputes by the deployment of
one of its warships through the 12 nautical-mile zone
around some of the disputed territories in the Spratly
Islands.88 Some U.S. experts, and some Asian governments, argue that Washington must take these types
of actions in order to preserve its credibility among its
regional friends and allies. In fact, U.S. assertiveness
regarding a complex issue that is not of direct national
security interest to the United States may actually undermine U.S. efforts to preserve extended deterrence
in the IAP by shifting attention away from those regional issues that really are of vital national interest to
the United States.
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Rather than a militarized approach to these outstanding territorial disputes in the South China Sea,
the United States should continue to press for diplomatic solutions of the type discussed by Clarence Bouchat in a recent monograph.89 To be effective, Washington must be seen by all parties as what Bouchat calls
an “honest broker.” He sees this as possible because
Washington “has less direct demands in the disputes,
garners more trust than most other states, and possesses resources to bear on these problems.”90 It is also
worth mentioning that the United States could bolster
its image as an honest broker by ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
While some experts will argue that efforts by the
United States to demilitarize these territorial disputes
may simply encourage Beijing to be even more assertive and uncooperative, Avery Goldstein warns the
United States that there is an even more serious risk
of crisis mismanagement between Washington and
Beijing.
Neither China nor the United States has clearly defined its vital interests across broad areas of the western Pacific. . . . Such Chinese and U.S. ambiguity about
the ‘redlines’ that cannot be crossed without risking
conflict increases the chances that either side could
take steps that it believes are safe but that turn out to
be unexpectedly provocative.91

Third, the United States needs to increase its diplomatic efforts to convince Beijing that it is prepared to
accept China as a true partner in the management of
the global economy. While both parties have made an
effort to sustain a dialogue on economic matters, they
often speak different languages. Official Chinese and
American statements regarding the recently complet-
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ed 7th round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
illustrate this problem. David Dollar and Wei Wang
have pointed out that Chinese representatives have
been very positive in their assessments of the results
of these deliberations, while U.S. spokespersons and
the American media have been much more pessimistic. They conclude that one reason for these different
perspectives is that “Chinese officials are largely happy with the status quo whereas the U.S. government is
not.”92 However, as Beijing adjusts to the new normal
of significantly reduced GDP growth, its world view
may come more into line with Washington’s, making
it easier for the two sides to identify opportunities for
cooperation.
Over the last 15 years, U.S. policymakers have
focused on issues in U.S.-China economic relations,
which, although serious, are not fundamental. Examples include the U.S. trade imbalance with China,
Chinese currency manipulation, Chinese copyright infringements, and the lack of transparency in Chinese
economic activities.93 Washington cannot disregard
these areas of dispute, but it needs to place these issues in context. As the ripple effects from the recent
downturn in the Chinese economy should make clear,
China is already an indispensable nation in the global
economy. Yet Washington and Beijing continue to
pursue major economic initiatives in relative isolation
from each other. America’s efforts to construct the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have been
separate from China’s sponsorship of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). While accepting in
principle China’s status as the world’s second biggest
economy, the United States has yet to engage China
in wide-ranging substantive discussions about G-2
global economic cooperation. One model for such dis42

cussions is the 2012 Durban Platform talks on climate
change, which took the form of meta-negotiations, defined as “negotiations about what to negotiate.”94
A more ambitious campaign of diplomatic engagement with China would also benefit from public statements by the United States that recognize significant
domestic accomplishments by Beijing. U.S. representatives must continue to comment on human rights
violations and infringements on civil liberties by the
Chinese government. However, China also deserves
to be commended for its unprecedented success at
raising a significant portion of its population out of
abject poverty in less than 4 decades. As former Director of the Chinese Institute for Strategic Studies Pan
Zhenqiang recently observed, “China is still burdened
with 128-million people living in poverty.”95 China’s
success to date is nonetheless extraordinary, and U.S.
policymakers can and should celebrate this campaign
as a major victory in the advancement of human rights.
Giving credit to China in this way could go a long way
toward overcoming some of the most serious barriers
to Sino-American dialogue.
The policies that are recommended in this monograph will be hard for some American experts and
policymakers to accept if they are still wedded to the
proposition that the United States must remain the
dominant player in the IAP region. For the time being,
the United States is, in fact, the dominant military actor in the region. However, the military chessboard is
only one of several chessboards upon which the game
of international relations is being played in the IAP.
China is arguably already the dominant regional player in terms of economics, and various governments
are dominant on certain other issues.96 The important
point is that neither the United States nor China will be
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able to muster enough elements of national power to
achieve regional dominance in the foreseeable future.
The United States will be adjusting to the implications
of relative decline within the global economy, while
concurrently grappling with persistent economic and
infrastructure problems at home.97 Conversely, China
will continue to face numerous domestic challenges,
including problems associated with structural adjustment of the economy, severe problems of pollution,
and resource scarcity. Beijing will also have to overcome concerted efforts by many of its regional neighbors to “Gulliverize” the People’s Republic of China
by both hard and soft power forms of balancing.98
Michael Swaine has argued that acceptance by
both parties of the fact that neither can achieve and
sustain regional dominance is the necessary first step
toward “finding a way to develop a mutually beneficial means of transitioning from U.S. predominance
toward a stable, more equitable balance of power in
the Western Pacific.”99 It is not, however, a sufficient
condition for the establishment of such a regional order. Efforts by Washington and Beijing to establish
procedures and understandings that would facilitate
cooperation could founder on any of the aforementioned legacy issues that have bedeviled U.S.-China
relations for decades, including Chinese support
for North Korea, Chinese claims to Taiwan, and
the disputed territories in the East China and South
China Seas.
Washington will also have to cope with the fact
that China is a moving target. In an influential article
in Foreign Affairs, Wang Jisi has argued that China’s
“core interests” are security, sovereignty, and development.100 If the elements of these three core interests
were self-evident, it would be relatively easy for the
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United States to engage China in substantive dialogue
about a modus vivendi. Unfortunately, as the history
of great power transitions makes clear, a rapidly rising power is constantly in the process of redefining
and expanding its understanding of its non-negotiable core interests, such as security, sovereignty, and
development. Under these circumstances, it will be
incumbent upon the United States to constantly reassess and adjust its policies toward China in order to
sustain bilateral cooperation.
OBAMA’S PIVOT GOES GLOBAL
Hal Brands has observed that grand strategy “requires ruthless prioritization.” However, he also has
noted, “even a flawless plan can be bankrupted by
failures of implementation.”101 It would have been
nice if managing the pivot to Asia were the only international problem that the Obama team faced. Over the
last 5 years, however, it has become increasingly obvious to Washington that a campaign that prioritizes the
IAP must be placed in a larger geostrategic context,
for three reasons.
First, even before some U.S. policymakers began
to lay the foundation for the pivot to Asia, they recognized the difficulty of preserving an artificial distinction between the Indian and Pacific oceans. This conceptual problem became more acute as Washington
focused more and more of its attention on Southeast
Asia and Oceania. Key American partners, most notably Australia and Singapore, took the lead in nudging the United States toward an Indo-Pacific, rather
than a Western Pacific, orientation. Washington also
took note of the fact that China was guided by its own
Indo-Pacific perspective, as illustrated by its sponsorship of the Maritime Silk Road and its development of
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a “string of pearls” network of port facilities in the Bay
of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.102
The adoption of an Indo-Pacific orientation by both
Beijing and Washington has inevitably enhanced India’s strategic importance as “the ultimate pivot state”
in the pivot strategy.103 With the second largest population in the world, a gross domestic product only
slightly less than the combined GDP of all ten ASEAN
countries, an economic growth rate that outpaces China (7.5 percent versus 6.9 percent in 2015), and a geographic placement between the Strait of Malacca and
the Persian Gulf, India demands, and has received,
Washington’s increased support.104 Furthermore, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi has
encouraged such support by an active foreign policy
that has transformed India’s “look east” campaign into
an “act east” campaign. This has taken several forms,
including improvements in India’s maritime power
projection capability, minilateral defense-cooperation
agreements, and joint naval exercises with ASEAN
governments and Australia.
Barring a significant increase in Chinese aggressive behavior, however, it is not likely that either New
Delhi or Washington will be pressing for significantly
enhanced bilateral defense cooperation. India is still
too enamored of its tradition of “strategic autonomy,”
and they are still not convinced that the U.S. pivot can
be relied upon over the long term.105 U.S. defense planners, meanwhile, are reticent to become more deeply
involved in what Zbigniew Brzezinski has described
as the competitive triangle between India, China, and
Pakistan.106 This is particularly true at a time when the
United States is looking for ways to enhance U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation and influence Pakistan’s
decisions regarding its nuclear arsenal.107 New Delhi
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and Washington can nonetheless take some encouragement from the very considerable overlap in their
strategic interests and goals in the Indo-Pacific.
Washington and New Delhi also share an interest
in competing with Beijing for influence in continental South and Central Asia. This vast region, which
includes much of the area identified by Sir Halford
Mackinder as the Heartland, has been the focus of
much of China’s diplomatic and economic activity
in recent years. Beijing began this campaign in 2001
with its support for the multi-purpose Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and has since reinforced its efforts with the creation of the Silk Road
Economic Belt across Central Asia.108 Washington has
responded to these initiatives with its own New Silk
Road campaign, which is designed to foster regional
energy cooperation, assist regional governments to
integrate into the global economy, and encourage the
development of trade and transport between Central
and South Asia. For its part, India’s decision to join
the SCO can be interpreted as confirmation that New
Delhi has accepted the need to establish a modus vivendi with China in South/Central Asia as a precondition
for becoming “a leading power, not just a balancing
power.”109
China and India must also find ways to reassure
each other of their support for unrestricted maritime
transport across the Indo-Pacific. A recent report by
the IISS makes the case for why the Indo-Pacific area
is too big to fail; “the economic and strategic interconnectedness of the two-Ocean region translates
into both mutual benefit . . . and mutual vulnerability.”110 Robert Kaplan argues, “India has aspirations
for a Monroe Doctrine-style presence throughout the
Indian Ocean”; while John Mearsheimer states, “We
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should expect China to devise its own version of the
Monroe Doctrine” in the Western Pacific.111 If both of
these authors are correct, then both India and China
are pursuing dangerously ill-advised strategies. New
Delhi cannot realistically assume that it can regulate
China’s Maritime Silk Road in the Indian Ocean without precipitating confrontations with the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) on the high seas or
facing Chinese military reprisals in the contested regions along their nearly 4,000 kilometer border.112 For
its part, Beijing cannot realistically expect that it will
ever be capable of regulating maritime traffic in the
Western Pacific, even if it succeeds in militarizing and
establishing control over most of the disputed territories in the East China and South China Seas. America’s naval presence, and the combined naval capabilities of Washington’s regional friends and allies, will
prohibit such an eventuality. Furthermore, since the
Indian and Pacific oceans are a single entity for purposes of maritime transit, Indian naval forces would
pose significant problems for China if it chose to pursue a campaign of maritime domination in the Pacific.
Indeed, even Washington has come to accept that in
a globalized international system it can no longer adhere to the exclusionary and interventionist principles
of the Monroe Doctrine in the western hemisphere.113
China’s global activism—well beyond Mackinder’s
Heartland—represents the second development that
has convinced the Obama Administration to widen its
focus beyond Asia. The Chinese government has concluded that in order to sustain its economic growth
and insure itself of uninterrupted access to essential
resources and markets, it has to pursue a globalized
foreign policy backed up with capabilities for longrange force projection. The United States has respond-
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ed by competing with Beijing for access and influence
far beyond the Indo-Pacific and South/Central Asia.
One result of this competition has been increased leverage for governments and regional organizations
in Africa and Latin America, who no longer see the
United States and the institutions of the Washington
Consensus as the only game in town. African leaders, who have benefited from an estimated $22 billion
in Chinese investments and the presence of a million Chinese workers on the continent, were underwhelmed when the Obama Administration pledged
in 2013 to invest $14 billion in the region.114 In the case
of Latin America, the IISS concludes that, “The region
has become stronger economically and increasingly
independent and self-assured on the political front.”115
Under these circumstances, the United States has had
to look for imaginative ways to use diplomatic, information, and military instruments to compensate for
Chinese economic advantages in the competition for
influence in Africa and Latin America.
The third reason why the Obama Administration
has adopted a global perspective is that it has become
clear that it made a mistake by implying that the
pivot to Asia meant that the United States was turning its back on Europe and the Middle East.116 What
was meant as a strategic adjustment was interpreted
by some European and Middle Eastern friends and
allies as irresponsible abandonment. Furthermore, as
Thomas Christensen has argued:
the language also created problems with U.S. partners
in Asia. They were supposed to be reassured, but because the United States had unwittingly suggested
that it could not handle two problems at once, predictably some of them now worry that the United States
might pivot away again.117
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It is ironic that the United States has refocused its
attention on transatlantic relations in part because it
has been reminded by Beijing that Europe is still an
extraordinarily important international actor. Stefan
Fröhlich contends that European Union (EU)-China
“relations have undergone an impressive development, and far more and deeper institutional links
exist between the EU and China than between the
United States and China.”118 The EU is China’s most
important trading partner, and China is the EU’s second most important trading partner (after the United
States). Europe is also the western destination point
of Beijing’s continental and Maritime Silk Roads.
The EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
agreement, which has been in effect since 2003, addresses a range of issues, including foreign affairs, regional and global security, climate change, and global
economic governance. Furthermore, since 2010 the EU
and China have held annual summits at the level of
heads of state or government.119 The EU is therefore
in a position to play a much more influential and productive role in collaboration with the United States to
engage China. It can also assist the United States as
the western departure point of America’s New Silk
Road campaign of political and economic outreach to
Central Asia.
Washington has been frustrated by China’s success in encouraging what Fortune magazine has called
an “unseemly stampede for membership” in the Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank by some of America’s
transatlantic allies. It is a special source of embarrassment for the Obama Administration that Great Britain
was the first western nation to join the AIIB, and that
London has accorded a very high priority to close economic cooperation with Beijing. In preparation for his
state visit to the United Kingdom, Chinese leader Xi
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Jinping praised London for being “the Western country that is most open to China. This is a visionary and
strategic choice that fully meets Britain’s own longterm interest.”120 As illustrated by the difficult negotiations to create the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Washington will continue to face
challenges in its efforts to match Chinese economic
influence with its traditional allies in Europe. Beijing
will also be able to tell a convincing story about Europe’s essential role as the ultimate destination of the
One Belt, One Road campaign, backed up with significant funding for much-needed EU infrastructure development projects. If the United States can resist the
temptation to view Europe’s cooperation with China
in “us or them” terms, however, it should be able to
work with its transatlantic partners to find room for
China in the global economy. Indeed, even Great
Britain’s evolving “special relationship” with China
should prove to be an especially valuable resource for
Washington as it looks for ways to engage and reassure Beijing.
By contrast to the European situation, where closer
transatlantic cooperation can actually contribute to an
American campaign of constructive engagement with
China, problems in the Middle East threaten to undermine Washington’s ability to sustain the pivot to Asia.
The Obama Administration has been criticized for not
becoming more militarily involved in the region—to
keep the lid on tensions in Iraq and Afghanistan, to
impose a solution to the Syrian crisis, to end Iran’s nuclear program once and for all. To his credit, the President has resisted these calls. Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, two of the individuals who helped to
shape Obama’s Middle East policies, have explained
why the President’s posture of restraint makes sense:
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At the same time that the salience of the Middle East
to U.S. policy is waning and the interests of the United
States and its traditional partners in the Middle East
are diverging, the potential for American military
power to effect major change in the region is also diminishing. 121

They also assert that any proposal for military action in the Middle East must be weighed against “the
likelihood of sustained U.S.-Chinese rivalry that will
inevitably divert U.S. strategic attention to the IndoAsia-Pacific region.”122 As difficult as it will be for
Obama and his successor to continue to say no to calls
for regime change and nation building in the Middle
East, it will be necessary to persevere in order to stay
focused on the larger strategic goals associated with
the pivot to Asia.
SUSTAINMENT
The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) will continue to be the indispensable foundation for a longterm American pivot strategy in the IAP. As the most
visible and powerful institutional representation of
the American-led San Francisco system, USPACOM
can draw upon approximately 360,000 military and
civilian personnel, five aircraft carrier strike groups,
and about 2,500 aircraft to fulfill its missions of deterrence, reassurance, and engagement.123 It is the largest
unified combatant command, with an area of responsibility that covers about half of the earth’s surface—
from the West coast of the United States to the IndiaPakistan border. This region consists of 36 countries,
including what the RAND Corporation has described
as a “dense and wide network of allies, partners and
friends” that represents an extraordinary strength52

multiplier for USPACOM.124 The combatant command
provides “effective and assured presence” for the
most militarized region in the world, with 60 percent
of the world’s population and half of the world’s commercial shipping.125
Much of the expert commentary relating to USPACOM has focused on the roles played by the Air
Force and Navy, partly because of the uniquely maritime nature of the IAP region and partly because, as
General George Marshall once complained, these two
services are more “photogenic” than the Army.126 In
fact, the importance of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) becomes obvious when we shift the focus from
operational concepts, which are designed to respond
to specific military developments (i.e., Air-Sea Battle),
to a strategy of long-term sustainment of America’s
presence and influence in the IAP.127 The Army contributes to all three of the aforementioned missions of
USPACOM. It enhances deterrence by the presence of
land forces in areas of potential conflict—in particular
the Korean Peninsula. It also contributes to deterrence
by its support for air and missile defense. John Deni
contends that:
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) of allied and partner
countries is currently (and appears likely to remain) a
growth industry for the Army. . . . The Army already
has the lead role in operating the road-mobile Patriot
air defense missile. . . . Additionally, the Army is the
lead service for the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system . . .128

These systems bolster deterrence by “buy[ing]
decision space” according to Admiral Samuel
Locklear.129
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USARPAC will be especially important, over the
long haul, as an instrument for reassurance and productive engagement with IAP allies and partners. The
Army is the logical partner for most IAP militaries,
since land forces are the largest services in most IAP
nations. As a 2014-RAND report noted, “the Army has
historically been the most influential service in most
Asian countries.” The report also asserts, “Army-toArmy cooperation may also be less provocative to
China than interactions aimed at bolstering partners’
air and naval capabilities.”130 The Army also bolsters
America’s influence across the region by its contributions to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations in the IAP—the location of 80 percent of
the natural disasters that cause loss of life.131
Over the last few years, the Pentagon has taken
three steps to enhance USARPAC effectiveness in
the IAP region. Total deployed personnel have been
increased from approximately 80,000 to 106,000. The
Army has also introduced a new Pacific Pathways
initiative which will provide small forward deployed
units to countries in the region that do not have American military bases. The Army expects these small
units to participate in 29 regional exercises with 12
IAP nations over the next 5 years.132 The Army is also
committed to the development of Regionally Aligned
Forces with regional expertise and language skills
that should be more capable of working with local
populations in the IAP region over the long haul.133
Finally, the RAND corporation predicts that in the future Army units in the IAP region will be “tasked to
help defend not just air bases but also port, logistics
depots and hubs, critical geography . . . host-nation
infrastructure and urban populations.”134
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Military instruments of power will be necessary,
but not sufficient, tools for the sustainment of the
American pivot strategy. Washington must redouble
its efforts to combine its military activities with ambitious diplomatic, economic, and information initiatives if it hopes to sustain its presence and influence
across the region. The Obama Administration has
demonstrated its appreciation of this fact by the priority that it has accorded to its trips to Asian capitals, its
hosting of meetings with IAP leaders, and its efforts
to recruit support for the TPP. To keep this momentum going over the long term, Obama’s successors
will have to engage in what John Deni describes as another fundamental rebalancing: an effort to “rebalance
American foreign policy generally from over-reliance
on the military and toward greater reliance on diplomacy and development.” Deni commends the President for his effort to grapple with this challenge, but
he concludes that his efforts have “largely failed.”135
This should come as no surprise to anyone who has
studied the evolution and the functioning of the U.S.
national security bureaucracy. Absent such reform,
however, it is not likely that the United States will be
able to preserve and enhance its influence in the IAP
in the future.
CONCLUSION
The Obama Administration’s implementation of
the pivot to Asia over the last 5 years provides three
important lessons for strategists. First, establishing
priorities is an essential part of any grand strategy;
however, priority is not exclusivity. While making
the case for a nation’s top strategic priority, policymakers must also be explicit about second and third

55

level challenges and commitments and preserve the
flexibility to cope with unforeseeable developments.
Second, any grand strategy should assume the use of
all elements of national power and, to the extent possible, look for ways to integrate these elements so that
they are mutually reinforcing. The reality is that states
rarely have a well-balanced repertoire of elements
of power. In the case of U.S.-China relations, Washington’s military instruments dwarf its diplomatic,
information, and economic instruments. China, for
its part, has economic resources that eclipse its other
elements of power. Both governments have had difficulty adapting their dominant instruments of power
to situations that require other forms of influence.
Third, any grand strategy that involves extended deterrence must accord priority to the reassurance of
junior partners. Nevertheless—reassurance can invite exploitation. Convincing junior partners that the
dominant actor will not abandon them in the face of
rising threats can backfire if it encourages the junior
partners to assume that they do not have to make a
significant contribution to the security relationship.
Efforts by the dominant actor to reassure friends and
allies can also lead to over-commitment and entanglement in unwanted disputes.
Obama’s pivot to Asia was the right policy for the
United States in a situation that demanded “a more
limited set of political objectives abroad.”136 It made
sense in light of the global shift of economic power
from west to east. It also made sense as a cautious response to the rise of China as a potential global peer
competitor. If managed properly, it can still serve as
the foundation for an American grand strategy that
defends and advances U.S. national interests, preserves key elements of the liberal international order,
and facilitates cooperation in the face of threats to the
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global commons. This will require Obama’s successor to keep her or his focus on the IAP, while at the
same time remaining actively but selectively involved
in other regions and various global issues. It will also
require the next President to continue to develop and
employ diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power, so that Washington does not have
to rely so heavily on military resources. With a more
balanced repertoire of power, the United States will
be better prepared to pursue policies that undergird
peace and prosperity throughout the IAP region, and
in the words of Lee Kwan Yew, give China “every incentive to choose international cooperation which will
absorb its energies constructively for another 50 to 100
years.”137
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